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1 Introduction 
Recent conflicts such as those in Sudan, Sri Lanka and Gaza highlight the importance of 
providing assistance to civilians in need during time of armed conflict.  With the 
passing celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions1 on 12 August 
2009, it is important to look into the legal obligations incumbent on States under 
international humanitarian law today, particularly in the light of allegations of instances 
of the denial of humanitarian assistance in such conflicts.  It seems that the debates in 
legal literature have placed a greater focus on the provision of humanitarian assistance 
by the use of force,2 rather than emphasizing and highlighting the legal duty of the State 
concerned to provide it.  This paper will explore what constitutes humanitarian 
assistance, who is entitled to it, and ultimately it will assess the legal duty of States3 to 
provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population under their control.  The 
paper examines four main areas: (i) where a State may legally deny humanitarian 
assistance; (ii) where a State may lawfully or unlawfully impede humanitarian 
assistance; (iii) the reckless denial of humanitarian assistance by States; and (iv) the 
denial of humanitarian assistance as an international crime.  In each of these areas the 
paper will offer a review of the obligations on States under international humanitarian 
law and provide an analysis of these. It will also highlight those provisions in 
international humanitarian law which may need more clarification and those areas in 
which gaps may exist in the law. 
                                                 
1
 The First, Second, Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions are hereafter referred to in the footnotes as 
GC I, GC II, GC III and GC IV respectively. GC I: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949; GC II: Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 
August 1949; GC III: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949; 
GC IV: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949. 
2
 This debate (often termed as ‘humanitarian intervention’) focuses on when humanitarian assistance is 
provided by force, without the consent of the concerned State, by another State, a group of States or by 
the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 1945 UN Charter. 
3
 For the purposes of this paper, “States” (also referred to in the Geneva Conventions as “High 
Contracting Parties”) means States which are Party to the four Geneva Conventions, and also includes 
States Party to the two Additional Protocols, hereafter referred to in the footnotes as API and APII. AP I: 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; APII: Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. 
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In times of armed conflict it can be difficult to get assistance to certain areas, for 
example, areas that are under siege or blockade or where the fighting is most violent.  
Issues of safety for those providing the humanitarian assistance come into play, as does 
obtaining the cooperation (and even in some cases, consent) of the party to a conflict4 
holding effective control of the territory in which humanitarian assistance is needed.  
For example, if an armed group, which is fighting the government authorities of the 
State, controls a large part of State territory, then the provision of humanitarian 
assistance may in practice require the cooperation and consent of both warring parties 
(i.e., both the State authorities and the armed group).   
 
The legal requirements under international humanitarian law can often be quite different 
to the reality on the ground.  In cases where consent is not required under law, it is often 
needed to ensure the safe arrival of aid.  Situations become increasingly complex when 
one or neither party to the conflict agrees to provide, or allow for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.  Even more difficulties arise in situations where humanitarian 
assistance is permitted but is impeded, for example, where it is diverted from its 
intended destination or unable to get there due to mine laying.  In these types of 
situations, the cooperation of both parties to the conflict can be imperative in securing a 
safe and secure route for aid convoys carrying humanitarian assistance to those in need. 
 
Under international law States have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right 
to life of all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.5  This requires 
that States must refrain from directly or indirectly violating this right, but also ensure 
this right is not violated.6  Whilst it is not the intention of this paper to analyze the 
relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law, 
it is important to note that the right to life and other basic fundamental rights of the 
individual are subject to different conditions under international humanitarian law.  The 
                                                 
4
 A “party to a conflict” is one which is directly participating in an armed conflict. It can be a State Party 
to the Geneva Conventions and/or their two Additional Protocols, a State non-Party or a non-State actor 
(for an explanation of a non-State actor, see footnote 14 of this paper). 
5
 Article 3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Article 6, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966. 
6
 Stoffels, Ruth Abril. Legal regulation of humanitarian assistance in armed conflict: Achievements and 
gaps. International Review of the Red Cross. No.855 (2004), p.517. 
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normally non-derogable right to life can be limited in times of armed conflict.7  When a 
State denies a civilian population humanitarian assistance which results in the loss of 
life, does it violate its duties under international humanitarian law and to what extent?   
 
International humanitarian law is also known as the law of armed conflict.  Treaty law 
and customary international humanitarian law8 are the main sources of international 
humanitarian law.  The main treaties of this area of law include the Hague 
Conventions,9 the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols.  Many of the 
provisions in the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions are considered to be 
a part of customary international humanitarian law.10  The phrase normally referred to 
as the “Martens Clause” was incorporated into Article 1(2) Additional Protocol I and 
places both civilians and combatants under the “protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of 
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”.11  The Martens Clause is 
important because, through its reference to customary law, it stresses the importance of 
customary norms in the regulation of armed conflicts.12  In addition, its reference to "the 
principles of humanity" and "the dictates of the public conscience" must be borne in 
mind when considering the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need. 
 
The principal instruments of international humanitarian law in use today are the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols, international treaties to which only States 
may become Party to.13  194 States are Party to the four Geneva Conventions and they 
therefore enjoy universal acceptance.  Additional Protocols I and II are slightly less 
widely embraced, with 168 and 164 State Parties respectively.  Should a State decide to 
                                                 
7
 “Non-derogable rights” are rights which cannot be violated under any circumstances. See: Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, para.25, p.240. 
8
 A rule is customary if it reflects state practice and when it is clear the international community 
requires such practice as a matter of law. See Cassese (2005) Chapter 8, p.153-169. 
9
 Hague Convention II: Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899; 
Hague Convention IV: Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907.  
10
 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, para.79, p.257. 
11
 It was also incorporated into GC I: Art. 63; GC II: Art. 62; GC III: Art. 142; GC IV: Art. 158 and the 
Preamble to APII. 
12
 Ticehurst, Rupert. The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict. International Review of the 
Red Cross. No. 317 (1997), p.125-134. 
13
 A State may become Party to a treaty by means of signature plus ratification, accession and 
succession.  
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become a Party to a treaty, it therefore consents to be bound by the rules and obligations 
contained within it.  However, all States and non-State actors14 involved in an armed 
conflict, including States not bound by treaty law, are bound by those rules which have 
crystallized into customary international humanitarian law. 
 
Should one of the States participating in an armed conflict not be a Party to the Geneva 
Conventions, in accordance with Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions the 
States which are Parties remain bound by it in their mutual relations.  Furthermore, 
States not formally Party to the Conventions may be bound by them if they accept and 
apply the provisions contained within.15 
 
As stated above, non-State actors are bound by customary international humanitarian 
law.  Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions states, “In the case of armed 
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, 
the following provisions…”.  A number of international courts have held Common 
Article 3 to constitute customary international humanitarian law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.16  The use of the phrase "each Party 
to the conflict" makes it possible for this provision to bind a non-State actor.  However, 
Common Article 3 does state that its application “shall not affect the legal status of the 
Parties to the conflict”.  Therefore, even if a non-State actor decided to apply the 
provisions of the Convention, it would in no way affect its legal status (i.e., it would not 
make it a State or a de jure government in its own right).   
 
Under Additional Protocol I, an authority of a non-State actor which represents peoples 
fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or against racist regimes may 
                                                 
14
 In the context of this paper, “non-State actors” are armed groups such as armed opposition groups, 
rebel fighters or insurgents. For more detailed discussion, see: Cassese (2005), p.124-131; and Clapham, 
Andrew. Human rights obligations of non-State actors in conflict situations. International Review of the 
Red Cross. No. 863 (2006), p.491-523. 
15
 Articles 1, 2 and 3 are ’common’ to all four Geneva Conventions, i.e., they are all reproduced exactly 
in GC I, GC II, GC III and GC IV. 
16
 See: The Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR, TC I, 2 September 1998, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para.608;  The 
Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY, AC, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para.98; Nicaragua v United States 
of America (Merits), ICJ, 27 June 1986, para.218. 
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undertake to apply the Conventions and the Protocol in relation to the conflict by means 
of a unilateral declaration.  Such a declaration will have the effect of bringing the 
Conventions and Additional Protocol I into force for the said authority with immediate 
effect.  It will also obligate the authority to assume the same rights and duties as a State 
which means that the Conventions and the Protocol will be equally binding upon all 
parties to the conflict.17 
 
In non-international armed conflicts, Article 1 of Additional Protocol II extends the 
application of Common Article 3 to dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups, which fulfil the requisite conditions.  These conditions require that they be 
under responsible command and exercise such control over a part of its territory as to 
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement 
the Protocol.  When comparing this Article with that of Common Article 3, which 
simply refers to the “case of armed conflict not of an international character”, it is 
evident that there is a much higher threshold of application in Additional Protocol II.  
The definition in Common Article 3 does not require that armed groups are fighting 
against the government of the territory, rather the conflict may be fought between 
armed groups within State territory or between an armed group outside State territory 
and the State.18  In establishing a much higher threshold, the range of applicability of 
Additional Protocol II to non-State actors is very much reduced in modern armed 
conflicts.19 
                                                 
17
 Article 96 API 
18
 Fleck (ed.), (2008) p.609. 
19
 Ibid., p.610. 
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2 Humanitarian assistance 
2.1 What is humanitarian assistance? 
The term ‘humanitarian assistance’ is one that is used broadly and there is no 
universally accepted exhaustive legal definition of it, nor is it the intention of this paper 
to provide one.   Generally, humanitarian assistance is provided in emergency 
situations, such as in armed conflict or as a result of a natural disaster.  It normally 
comprises of objects and services which are indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population, such as food and medical supplies.  In addition, humanitarian assistance 
must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality.20  
 
The right to humane treatment is at the very core of international humanitarian law, 
protecting persons in war both in international and non-international armed conflict.   
Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV obligates State parties in an international armed 
conflict to treat protected persons humanely at all times.  Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions obligates State parties in non-international armed conflicts to treat 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities humanely in all circumstances.  Article 75 
of Additional Protocol I and Article 4 of Additional Protocol II also offer fundamental 
guarantees of humane treatment.  The obligation to treat civilians in a humane way not 
only means the prohibition of certain behaviour, but also expresses a positive obligation 
on the State to act – including the provision of assistance in time of armed conflict to 
those in need. 21 
 
Elements of what might constitute humanitarian assistance can be found in various 
provisions of international humanitarian law.22  For the purposes of this paper, 
“humanitarian assistance” shall include the right to receive in time of armed conflict 
                                                 
20
 UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991). 
21
 Fleck (ed.), (2008) p.269. 
22
 Articles 23 and 55 GC IV; Articles 54, 69 and 70 API; Article 18(2) APII. 
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food, water, medical supplies, medical services, shelter, clothing, bedding and objects 
necessary for religious worship. 
 
2.2 Who is entitled to humanitarian assistance? 
Civilians are entitled to receive humanitarian assistance to alleviate the sufferings 
caused by war in both international and non-international armed conflicts.  This is true 
of the civilian population of any territory under the control of a party to the conflict, 
including those in occupied territories.23  In establishing who is entitled to humanitarian 
assistance, a distinction must first be made between international and non-international 
armed conflicts as the laws regulating the duty to provide humanitarian assistance are 
dependent on the nature of the conflict.   
 
An international armed conflict occurs when one State uses armed force against another 
State, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.  A situation is also 
classed as an international armed conflict in all cases of partial or total military 
occupation of a State territory, even if the occupation is met with no armed resistance.24  
The effect of Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I is to extend the applicability of the 
provisions relating to international armed conflict to also include armed conflicts in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in the exercise of self-determination.25   
 
A non-international armed conflict (sometimes referred to as an ‘internal conflict’) is a 
confrontation within a single national territory between the armed forces of the existing 
governmental authority and dissident armed forces, or other organized armed groups, 
which exercise such control over a part of national territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations.26  From considering the text of the 
relevant applicable provisions in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols, non-international armed conflicts do not include situations of internal 
                                                 
23
 Articles 23, 55, 59 GC IV; Articles 69 and 70 API; Article 18(2) APII. 
24
 Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions. 
25
 Article 1(4) API. 
26
 Article 1(1) APII. 
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disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature.27 
 
In international armed conflicts, ‘protected persons’ are entitled to receive humanitarian 
assistance.  Geneva Convention IV deals with humanitarian assistance with respect to 
protected persons in time of war.  Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV defines protected 
persons as “those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find 
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.  Article 4 also provides that 
nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it, nor 
are the nationals of a neutral State or of another State taking part in the armed conflict, 
as long as their State has normal diplomatic relations in the State whose hands they are.  
Article 4 makes it very difficult to ascertain the legal obligation of a State towards 
civilians who are not nationals of an internationally recognized State.  For example, 
those civilians living in Gaza today, who consider themselves to be Palestinian, yet in 
the absence of an internationally recognized State of Palestine.28  
 
However, the application of the provisions of Part II of the Convention, “General 
Protection of Populations Against Certain Consequences of War”, is widened by Article 
13 of the Convention to include the whole populations of the countries in conflict, 
“without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or 
political opinion”.  Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV stipulates that if an individual 
protected person is definitely suspected of, or engaged in, activities hostile to the 
security of the State, that person shall not be entitled to the rights and privileges under 
the Convention, if these would be prejudicial to the security of the State, however, in 
each case such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity.  The withholding of 
humanitarian assistance would arguably constitute inhumane treatment.  “Activities 
hostile to the security of the State” is not defined by the Convention. The ICRC 
Commentary on Article 5 suggests that what is meant is “probably above all espionage, 
                                                 
27
 Article 1(2) APII. 
28
 This is a very complex issue which the length of this paper does not allow me to discuss. The ICRC 
Commentary on Article 4 GC IV, p.47, does seem to suggest it would be for the State in whose hands 
they are to decide whether the persons concerned should or should not be regarded as citizens of the 
country. 
 9 
sabotage and intelligence with the enemy Government or enemy nationals”.29  The 
ambiguity of this Article is an unfortunate lacuna in Geneva Convention IV.  It is also 
unclear which authority may determine what action would be prejudicial to the security 
of the State and begs the question whether the sustenance of an adversary could be 
considered this.  The ICRC Commentary concludes, “It must be emphasized most 
strongly, therefore, that Article 5 can only be applied in individual cases of an 
exceptional nature, when the existence of specific charges makes it almost certain that 
penal proceedings will follow.  This Article should never be applied as a result of mere 
suspicion”.30   
 
Section II of Additional Protocol I, “Relief in Favour of the Civilian Population” states 
that its provisions are supplementary to the relevant provisions of Geneva Convention 
IV.  Its provisions apply to “the civilian population” in international armed conflict as 
defined by the Protocol.31  Article 50 defines the civilian population.  A civilian is any 
person who is not a combatant (i.e., not a member of the armed forces, militias or other 
volunteer corps, organized resistance movement, nor a person who has spontaneously 
taken up arms to resist the approach of an invading enemy).  In case of doubt whether a 
person is a civilian, the person shall be considered to be a civilian.32  The civilian 
population comprises all persons who are civilians.33  The presence of individuals who 
do not fall within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its 
civilian character.34   
 
A civilian is generally accepted to be a person who is not taking a direct part in the 
fighting.  The term “combatant” is commonly used to describe persons who are taking a 
direct part in the fighting.  Additional Protocol I defines combatants as persons who are 
members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict, however the term does not include 
medical personnel and chaplains in the armed forces.35  The armed forces of a conflict 
consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
                                                 
29
 ICRC Commentary Article 5 GC IV, p.56. 
30
 Ibid., p.58. 
31
 Article 68 API. 
32
 Article 50(1) API. 
33
 Article 50(2) API. 
34
 Article 50(3) API. 
35
 Article 43(2) API.  
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responsible to a party to the conflict for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that 
party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse 
party.  Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter 
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict.36  In order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effect 
of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to 
an attack.37   
 
Rule 5 of the ICRC Study on customary international humanitarian law simplifies the 
above into the following customary rule: “Civilians are persons who are not members of 
the armed forces. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians”.38  
The study asserts that state practice establishes this rule as a norm of customary 
international humanitarian law applicable in international armed conflicts.  It also notes 
that although this rule also applies to non-international armed conflicts, state practice in 
this regard is ambiguous as to whether members of armed opposition groups are 
considered members of armed forces or civilians.39   
 
It is important to determine whether the entitlement to civilian protection also affects 
the entitlement of a civilian to humanitarian assistance.  In international armed 
conflicts, Section I, Part IV of Additional Protocol I contains provisions regarding the 
protection of the civilian population, with Article 51(3) providing, “Civilians shall 
enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities.”  In non-international armed conflicts, civilians are afforded 
humanitarian assistance under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
(applicable in situations of non-international armed conflict and considered customary 
law)40 and Additional Protocol II.  Common Article 3 stipulates that “persons taking no 
                                                 
36
 Article 43(1) API. 
37
 Article 44(3) API. 
38
 Customary International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules. Edited by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and 
Louise Doswald-Beck. (International Committee of the Red Cross) / Cambridge (Cambridge University 
Press) 2007, p.17. (This publication will hereafter be referred to in this paper as the ‘ICRC Study on 




 See footnote 16 of this paper. 
 11 
active part in the hostilities” shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.  Article 
13(3) of Additional Protocol II provides that civilians shall enjoy the protection 
afforded by Part IV of the Protocol “unless and for such time as they take a direct part 
in hostilities.”  It is necessary therefore, to explore briefly the concept of participation in 
hostilities. The recent publication of the ICRC’s, Interpretive Guidance on the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities under international humanitarian law determines that 
in order to qualify as a direct participation in hostilities, “a specific act must meet the 
following cumulative criteria: (1) The act must be likely to adversely affect the military 
operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack 
(threshold of harm), and; (2) there must be a direct causal link between the act and the 
harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and; (3) the act must be 
specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a 
party to the conflict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus)”.41 
 
The ICRC publication also provides some insight into the temporal scope for the loss of 
protection from direct attack arising from the phrase “unless and for such time” and 
makes a clear distinction between civilians and members of organized armed groups.  It 
clarifies that “such suspension lasts exactly as long as the corresponding civilian 
engagement in direct hostilities” and that the ‘revolving door’42  of civilian protection 
“is an integral part, not a malfunction, of [international humanitarian law].  It prevents 
attacks on civilians who do not, at the time, represent a military threat”.43  It discusses 
that although this mechanism of protection may make it more difficult for the enemy, 
“it remains necessary to protect the civilian population from erroneous or arbitrary 
attack and must be acceptable for the operating forces or groups as long as such 
participation occurs on a merely spontaneous, unorganized or sporadic basis”.44  
Members of organized armed groups, in contrast to civilians, “cease to be civilians for 
                                                 
41
 Melzer, Nils. Interpretive Guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities under 
international humanitarian law. Geneva (International Committee of the Red Cross) 2009, p.46. 
42
 The ‘revolving door’ debate is used to describe the notion of an individual as a ‘civilian by day’ and 
‘combatant by night’. This is a highly contentious issue difficult to resolve when armed forces are trying 
to establish legitimate military targets.  
43
 Melzer, supra footnote 41, p.70. 
44
 Ibid., p.71. 
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as long as they remain members by virtue of their continuous combat function […] In 
other words, the ‘revolving door’ of protection starts to operate based on 
membership”.45 
 
Based on the conclusions above, it would seem that for the time a civilian is taking a 
direct part in hostilities, he/she will lose the protection afforded to civilians against 
direct attack.  However, once he/she has stopped taking part the protection will return.  
In determining whether the loss of civilian protection also affects the entitlement of a 
civilian to humanitarian assistance, it is important to return to the provisions of 
international humanitarian law.  As stated above, in international armed conflicts, 
Article 51(3) in Section I, Part IV of Additional Protocol I provides that civilians only 
enjoy the protection afforded by Section I “unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities”.  However, Section II, Part IV, deals with “Relief in Favour of the 
Civilian Population” which suggests that civilians losing protection under Section I 
(i.e., losing protection from attack) do not necessarily forfeit their entitlement to 
humanitarian assistance.   
 
The situation is slightly different in non-international armed conflicts.  Additional 
Protocol II, Part IV deals with both the protection of the civilian population (Article 13) 
and the provision of humanitarian assistance (Article 18).  Article 13(3) states, 
“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities”.  Therefore, it could be concluded that civilians lose 
their entitlement to receive humanitarian assistance for the duration of their engagement 
in hostilities.  However, it could be argued (following the ICRC’s findings, that a 
civilian does not cease to be a member of the civilian population when taking part in 
hostilities), that humanitarian assistance must be provided to the entire civilian 
population, regardless of the temporal scope of protection from attack of individual 
civilians.  Although it is difficult to reconcile these two opposing positions of a civilian 
as a legitimate military target on one side, and on the other side, as an individual in need 
of supplies essential to survival, the findings of the ICRC publication suggests that this 
situation is necessary to protect the larger civilian population as a whole.  
                                                 
45
 Ibid., p.71 and p.72. 
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It would be too difficult to ascertain whether to allow an individual access to 
humanitarian assistance, which he/she would not be legally entitled to whilst taking part 
in hostilities, but then entitled to again once he/she has stopped.  This would prove near 
impossible when faced with the ‘farmer by day, guerilla by night’ scenario.  What is 
clear is that combatants in international armed conflicts and fighters in non-international 
armed conflicts are not eligible to receive humanitarian assistance.  However, with the 
humane treatment requirement in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions for 
“persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause”,46  the entitlement of humanitarian assistance could also 
be argued to stretch not just to those who have taken part in hostilities, but to those who 
no longer do so. 
 
2.3 Who are the providers of humanitarian assistance? 
There are many possible providers of humanitarian assistance, for example, the State 
itself, one State acting on behalf of another State, an Occupying Power, international 
organizations, non-international organizations, charitable and humanitarian 
organizations, States acting upon a UN Security Council resolution.  As mentioned in 
the introduction, this paper will only deal with the duty of the State under international 
humanitarian law to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population under its 
control. 
 
2.4 The duty of the State 
The duty of providing a civilian population with the supplies essential for its survival 
arguably rests first and foremost with the State exercising control over that civilian 
population.  Article 29 of Geneva Convention IV states “The Party to the conflict in 
whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to 
them by its agents”.  If the civilians of a party to an international armed conflict are not 
                                                 
46
 ’Hors de combat’: a French term, literally meaning ‘out of the fight’ refers to combatants unable to 
carry on taking part in hostilities.  
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adequately supplied with indispensable goods then relief actions shall be undertaken, 
subject to the agreement of the parties concerned in such relief actions.47  All States, 
even those which are not party to the conflict, are obligated to grant free passage of 
relief consignments.48  It is also the duty of the State to provide civilians in occupied 
territory with the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources 
of the occupied territory are inadequate.49   If it is unable to do so, then the Occupying 
Power is duty-bound to agree to relief schemes to provide the necessary humanitarian 
assistance on behalf of the population.  Such assistance may be provided by States or by 
impartial humanitarian organizations, such as the ICRC.50  Civilians who find 
themselves in the territory of a party to the conflict are also entitled to receive 
individual or collective relief that may be sent to them by their own States.51  In cases of 
non-international armed conflict, if the civilian population is suffering undue hardship 
owing to a lack of supplies essential for its survival, relief actions shall be undertaken 
subject to the consent of the State concerned.52   
 
It is important to look closely at the legal language of the relevant provisions of 
international humanitarian law when deducing the duty of the State in this regard.  
Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV, although stipulating that States “shall allow” for 
free passage, does grant States the right to make passage conditional upon certain 
conditions being fulfilled.  It may therefore be deduced from the Article that “consent” 
is not actually a requirement of Article 23, as it infers that free passage should be 
granted (i.e., not consented to) unless certain conditions are present which would enable 
a State to disallow such passage.  In contrast, Article 70(1) of Additional Protocol I 
provides that relief actions shall be undertaken “subject to the agreement of the Parties 
concerned in such relief actions”.  In this case, it is clear that in order for humanitarian 
assistance to be granted, consent is actually required not just by the State concerned, but 
also by other parties concerned in the relief actions.  In situations where relief must 
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cross between States, particularly those at war with each other, this requirement can be 
problematic.  
 
The ICRC Commentary on Article 70 confirms that the types of party concerned within 
the meaning of the Article “are primarily the Parties from which the relief is to come 
(assuming of course that it is not the government itself which has initiated the relief 
action or will be sending the relief consignments) and the Parties for which the relief is 
intended.  However, it should be stressed once again that this provision should be read 
in conjunction with Article 54 (Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population) which prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, 
and the possibility of refusing a relief action or relief consignments is not a matter of 
discretion: such refusals should thus remain exceptional”.53   
 
Article 70(1) also raises the question of whether a State must be obliged to accept relief 
actions on behalf of its own population, upon which the sovereignty of States must be 
discussed.  The ICRC Commentary clarifies this question somewhat in its explanation 
of the drafting process of this provision.  During negotiations, it was stressed that the 
expression “subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned”, did not involve any 
infringement of the sovereignty of the Parties concerned and suggested that the 
necessary agreement should not be withheld, and thus the expression should be 
interpreted in this sense.  Furthermore, the Commentary purports, this interpretation is 
actually supported by the provision of Article 54(1) which prohibits the starvation of 
civilians as a method of warfare.54  
 
The issue of consent is slightly different in non-international armed conflicts.  Article 
18(2) of Additional Protocol II, states that relief actions shall be undertaken “subject to 
the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”.  The ICRC Commentary on this 
provision states that, “In principle the ‘High Contracting Party concerned’ means the 
government in power.  In exceptional cases, when it is not possible to determine which 
are the authorities concerned, consent is to be presumed in view of the fact that 
assistance for the victims is of paramount importance and should not suffer any 
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delay”.55  The Commentary goes on to state, “The fact that consent is required does not 
mean that the decision is left to the discretion of the parties.  If the survival of the 
population is threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required 
conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief 
actions must take place.  In fact, they are the only way of combating starvation when 
local resources have been exhausted”.56  
 
The above establishes that in accordance with the two Additional Protocols, in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts the obligation to consent or agree to 
humanitarian assistance rests clearly with the State, either as a High Contracting Party 
or as a party concerned in the relief actions.  Both Article 70 of Additional Protocol I 
and Article 18(2) of Additional Protocol II state that relief actions “shall be 
undertaken”.  In addition, in relation to occupied territories, Article 59 Geneva 
Convention IV states that the Occupying Power “shall agree to relief schemes” on 
behalf of the occupied population.  The use of the word “shall” in the Articles by the 
drafters clearly denotes a duty on the State.  Refusal of humanitarian assistance by the 
State without good grounds would be a violation of its duties under international 
humanitarian law.  
 
 
                                                 
55





3 Legally permissible denial of humanitarian assistance 
There are certain circumstances in which the denial of humanitarian assistance is legally 
permissible under humanitarian law.  In situations of siege or naval blockade, the 
question of humanitarian assistance is a complex one as these methods of warfare are 
generally employed in an attempt to bring the hostilities to a close more quickly.  A 
siege generally takes place in a limited area, which is encircled by an army (the 
besieging force).  A siege of an enemy position may result in the supply of goods for 
the civilian population being cut off.57  A blockade is a means of obstructing an enemy 
coast or port so that vessels and aircraft are prevented from entering and departing, with 
the purpose of blocking supplies to an enemy coast.58  Whereas in a siege situation, the 
area is a military objective, it may or may not contain civilians; naval blockades, on the 
other hand, are likely to affect the civilian population as a whole. 
 
According to Article 17 of Geneva Convention IV, in international armed conflicts 
States shall “endeavour” to conclude local agreements for the removal of wounded, 
sick, infirm and aged persons, children and maternity cases from besieged or encircled 
areas, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical 
equipment on their way to such areas.  The use of the word “endeavour” does not 
denote a clear and firm obligation on States to fulfil this duty.  In addition, only some of 
the civilian population benefit from this provision.  Nor does the provision clarify what 
should happen to the rest of the civilian population, they must presumably stay within 
the besieged area.  However, under Additional Protocol I, the civilian population and 
individual civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military 
operations.59  Civilians must never be the object of attack and must be protected from 
indiscriminate attacks.60  States which are parties to the conflict must at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian 
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objects and military objectives.61  Article 54 of Additional Protocol I expressly prohibits 
the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.62  In addition, it is prohibited to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value 
to the civilian population or to the enemy, “whatever the motive, whether in order to 
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive”.63  However, 
this prohibition does not apply to objects used as sustenance solely for the members of 
the armed forces of the enemy, nor to those used by the enemy in direct support of 
military action, provided of course, that the civilian population will not be left with such 
inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.64  
 
It seems, therefore, that as long as the purpose is to achieve a military objective and the 
expected result will not cause the starvation of the civilian population, it may be legal to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population in a siege situation.  It is only lawful to starve members of enemy 
forces.65  A food supply which is used by the civilian population and enemy forces must 
therefore not be attacked or taken away.  It has to be used exclusively by the enemy 
armed forces to lose its immunity.  
 
Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV was drafted to deal with blockade situations.66  
However, looking closely at the Article it is apparent that the obligation created is 
limited in scope.  In addition to the conditions that a State may require to be met before 
allowing free passage, relief consignments intended for all civilians are in fact limited 
only to “medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship”.  The 
Article is subject to some interpretation as it states that each High Contracting Party to 
the Convention “shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential 
foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers 
and maternity cases.”  The word “likewise” in this sentence could denote it shall also 
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allow free passage of these goods intended only for civilians of another High 
Contracting Party, but it could also be interpreted to mean that free passage of 
consignments should be granted to all children under fifteen, expectant mothers and 
maternity cases, including those among its own nationals.  However, it may be more 
likely that the first interpretation was meant by the drafters.   
 
Regardless, it seems there is no requirement under Article 23 to allow for the passage of 
foodstuffs and clothing to the civilian population as a whole.  Nor is there an obligation 
to allow free passage of consignments intended for the State’s own civilians.  Therefore, 
under Geneva Convention IV, it could be argued that a blockade could be lawful as 
long as the purpose was to achieve a military objective, even if it resulted in the 
starvation of the civilian population.  However, this position would still be at odds with 
the obligation under Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV to treat protected persons 
humanely at all times; in addition, of course, to the customary international 
humanitarian law rule that parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and 
unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need.67  Similarly, Article 70 
of Additional Protocol I includes the obligation to allow and facilitate the “rapid and 
unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel” even if 
destined for the civilian population of the adverse party.68   
 
The ICRC Commentary on Article 23 highlights that the words "intended only for 
civilians" cannot be interpreted “a contrario as meaning that that right does not apply to 
medical consignments intended to be used for the treatment of wounded and sick of the 
armed forces”69 and that when such consignments are sent by sea, they are in fact 
entitled to free passage under Article 38 of Geneva Convention II.  “Such an 
interpretation is in full accordance with the general idea underlying the Geneva 
Conference, which, as we have mentioned on several occasions, tends to put the 
wounded and sick, whether civilians or members of the armed forces, on a footing of 
equality in the matter of relief. It would, therefore, be perfectly possible, if the present 
Article and the Article of the Second Convention mentioned were applied in 
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conjunction, for a medical consignment to be intended both for civilians and for 
wounded and sick members of a belligerent's armed forces”.70 
 
The ICRC Commentary on Article 54(1) of Additional Protocol I emphasizes that the 
object of a blockade is to deprive the adversary of supplies needed to conduct 
hostilities, and not to starve civilians.  However, if the effects of the blockade lead to 
such results, reference should be made to the relief action which should be undertaken 
in accordance with Article 70 of the Protocol.  Moreover, the principle of the 
prohibition of starvation should command the evacuation of such persons if it turned out 
to be impossible to send sufficient aid for that part of the population of a besieged or 
encircled area in need.71 
 
With regard to non-international armed conflicts there are no such Articles in 
Additional Protocol II relating to sieges or naval blockades, however, Articles 13 and 
14 prohibit the attack of civilians, the use of starvation as a method of warfare, and the 
attack, destruction, removal or rendering useless of objects indispensable to the civilian 
population.  In addition, Article 18 provides for relief actions to be undertaken if the 
civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of essential supplies for 
its survival. 
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4 Lawful and unlawful impediment of humanitarian assistance 
Humanitarian assistance can be impeded from reaching its intended destination for 
many reasons, both lawful and unlawful.  International humanitarian law does provide 
States with a few permissible exceptions to allowing free passage of relief supplies.  
However, it is an unfortunate fact that in some cases humanitarian assistance is in fact 
wilfully impeded and that those in need are intentionally denied access to the supplies 
and personnel they need for their survival. 
 
Article 23 of Geneva Convention IV provides that States must allow free passage 
subject to being satisfied of a number of conditions.  These are that the State must have 
“serious reasons for fearing”: a) that the consignments may be diverted from their 
destination; b) that the control may not be effective; or c) that a definite advantage may 
accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the 
consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy 
or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be 
required for the production of such goods.  The conditions listed above could be 
interpreted to reduce the obligation on States to allow free passage, as it is not clear 
what exactly constitutes a “serious reason”, or for that matter, what is the threshold of 
“fear”.  It is also not stipulated upon which sort of information or intelligence this fear 
must be based on.  It seems, therefore, on the basis of Article 23, that States may refuse 
passage on their own assessment of the situation and at their own discretion.  
 
The ICRC Commentary on this Article states that a doubt as to the destination of 
consignments would not be sufficient reason for refusing them free passage; the fears of 
the State imposing the blockade must be based on serious grounds (i.e., they must have 
been inspired by the knowledge of certain definite facts).  The ICRC Commentary 
further states that the conditions laid down in Article 23 have been criticized as leaving 
too much to the discretion of the blockading Powers and that such objections appear to 
be only too well justified.  The Commentary stresses that the wording of Article 23 is 
vague and there is a danger that it may seriously jeopardize the principle set out in the 
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Article to allow free passage.  The ICRC Commentary also raises concern over Article 
23, where it allows States to refuse passage on the basis of a definite advantage which 
may accrue to the economy of the enemy (point (c) above).  It is stressed that the 
provision of humanitarian assistance does to some extent relieve the burden on the 
economy of the receiving party, however, when looking at the situation with some 
degree of proportionality, “there is no way in which one could weigh the humanitarian 
considerations of an action destined to ensure the survival of a civilian population 
lacking essential supplies against the advantage that such an action could have for the 
receiving Party, which would in any case always be minimal and indirect, even though 
it would be wrong to deny its existence altogether”.72 
 
Article 23 further reduces the strength of the obligation to allow free passage of 
consignments, by granting States the power to make permission conditional on the 
distribution to the persons benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of 
the Protecting Powers.73  It also gives States the right to prescribe the technical 
arrangements under which passage is allowed.  This is true also of States obligations 
under Article 70 of Additional Protocol I.  However, Article 70 does provide that States 
shall “in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which 
they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the 
interest of the civilian population concerned”.74  It also obligates States which are 
parties to the conflict to protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid 
distribution; in addition to requiring that all States encourage and facilitate effective 
international coordination of the relief actions.75 
 
In summary, the free passage and distribution of humanitarian assistance in 
international armed conflicts is subject to the consent and technical conditions of States 
where they believe that consignments: a) may be diverted; b) may not be under 
effective supervision and control; or c) may provide an advantage to their adversary.  If 
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a State has serious reasons for fearing the above, it can refuse the passage.  Where a 
State consents to the passage of humanitarian assistance, it must be forwarded as 
rapidly as possible.76  However, in those situations where it does not consent, or even in 
those where the State has invoked their rights under Article 23 of Geneva Convention 
IV and/or Article 70 of Additional Protocol I to prescribe the technical arrangements 
under which such passage is permitted, States may lawfully impede humanitarian 
assistance.  It is generally accepted that under these circumstances States are entitled to 
check or search consignments and arrange for their forwarding at prescribed times and 
on prescribed routes to ensure the safety of convoys and to safeguard against abuses by 
the enemy.77  States are not entitled to refuse passage; they must do so only on the 
grounds indicated above. 
 
In situations of occupation, in accordance with Article 59 of Geneva Convention IV, 
Occupying Powers must permit the free passage of consignments of foodstuffs, medical 
supplies and clothing, where it has agreed to a relief scheme.  Furthermore, they must 
guarantee the protection of these consignments.  Under Article 60 of Geneva 
Convention IV, consignments must in no way be diverted from the purpose for which 
they are intended, except in the case of urgent necessity, in the interests of the 
population of the occupied territory and with the consent of the Protecting Power. 
 
Both Article 70 of Additional Protocol I and Article 60 of Geneva Convention IV 
prohibit the diversion of consignments except in the case of urgent necessity.  The 
ICRC Commentary on Article 60 purports that the word "divert" must be understood in 
its broadest sense, as covering a change of destination of any kind, including 
requisition.  It explains the purpose behind this particular provision was to enable relief 
consignments to be diverted in certain situations, such as when epidemics stop in one 
town and start in another, when it is too difficult to transport relief consignments to the 
area chosen, or when there is a delay in the transport of perishable foodstuffs.  Under 
such circumstances, humanitarian assistance may be diverted and used on behalf of 
other persons.  However, this diversion must only take place in “cases of urgent 
necessity” which means they must only happen in very exceptional circumstances.  In 
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addition, the diversion must be in the interests of the civilian population receiving the 
relief.  In order to avoid abuses by Occupying Powers, the consent of Protecting Powers 
is also required.  The ICRC Commentary also notes that the conditions which may be 
imposed by the Party allowing the passage of relief consignments under Article 70(3) of 
Additional Protocol I are less restrictive than those in Article 23 of Geneva Convention 
IV.78  
 
In some cases, a party to the conflict may be unable to guarantee the security of the 
personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.  For example, in those cases where the civilian population in 
need is in the area where the fighting is taking place, a party to the conflict may not be 
able to guarantee the safety of the staff and convoys.  This may be because the other 
warring party does not care for the plight of the civilian population, or indeed because 
they are trying to kill them.  Mine laying of routes and attacks on convoys can also be a 
very real danger in war zones.  In addition, in some situations, a party may not even 
have the military resources in order to provide such security.  In these types of 
situations, in accordance with meeting their duty to respect and protect humanitarian 
assistance consignments and personnel,79 it may be lawful for States to impede 
humanitarian assistance for security reasons.   
 
Additional Protocol II does not contain any specific provision regarding impeding 
humanitarian assistance in non-international armed conflicts.  However, Rule 55 of the 
ICRC Study on customary international humanitarian law states that the rapid and 
unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in 
character and conducted without any adverse distinction, must be allowed and 
facilitated by parties to the conflict, subject to their right of control; and that this is 
customary international humanitarian law in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.80   
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Whilst the provisions of international humanitarian law listed above do allow for a State 
to take a number of measures to control the content and delivery of humanitarian 
assistance (which in some respects may impede the delivery), they do not allow for the 
deliberate or wilful impediment of assistance.81  For the purposes of this paper, wilful 
impediment of humanitarian assistance is different to intentional denial.  Intentional 
denial is discussed in this paper as the outright denial of humanitarian assistance (i.e., 
the assistance is not allowed to enter State territory, or relief consignments within the 
State are not permitted to be organized).  Wilful impediment, on the other hand, is 
discussed here in the context of a State allowing for the arrangement of humanitarian 
assistance to those in need, and then consequently impeding it from reaching its 
intended destination.  In both situations, the result can cause the prolonged suffering of 
the civilian population and starvation.  There are many means whereby humanitarian 
assistance can be wilfully impeded, including diverting relief convoys and 
consignments from their intended beneficiaries, refusing to guarantee the security of the 
convoys and personnel (where a State is in a position to do so), mining of the routes to 
be taken to the intended destination making transport and passage impossible; or for 
example, subjecting them to various delays including, inter alia, prolonged searches, 
unnecessary road blocks, or the imposition of extortionate taxes or bribes which must 
be paid before passage is granted.   
 
“Wilfully impeding relief supplies” as a method of starvation of civilians is listed as a 
war crime in international armed conflicts under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the 1998 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).82  The UN Security Council 
has condemned the impediment of relief supplies on many occasions, particularly in the 
conflict of Bosnia and Herzegovina83 and more recently, in the conflict in Sudan.84  It 
would seem that a customary international humanitarian rule is gradually forming 
prohibiting the wilful impediment of relief supplies both in international and non-
international armed conflicts. 
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5 Reckless denial of humanitarian assistance 
“Recklessness” is defined by Cassese as “a state of mind where a person forsees that his 
or her action is likely to produce its prohibited consequences, and nevertheless willingly 
takes the risk of so acting”.85  In the case of recklessness a person only envisages that a 
result will be possible or likely, but even so “deliberately takes the risk; however, he 
does not necessarily will or desire the result”.86  Whilst Cassese refers to recklessness in 
the context of individual criminal liability, a State could similarly be accused of acting 
recklessly if it failed to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population under 
its control.  Whilst it is clear that States act through their State officials (which are of 
course individuals), in certain circumstances an act of an individual State official may 
be attributable to a State, therefore imputing responsibility of the act to the State.  
 
Article 1 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Draft Articles)87 provides that “Every 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State”.  Article 2 establishes that an international wrongful act of a State occurs when 
conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under 
international law and constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.  
Chapter II of the ILC Draft Articles details under which circumstances certain conduct 
may be attributed to the State.  Whilst it is not the intention of this paper to provide a 
detailed discussion on the subject of state responsibility, it is important to note that the 
conduct of any person or entity (which has official status in accordance with the internal 
law of the State) shall be considered an act of the State under international law provided 
the person or entity is acting within their official capacity in the particular instance.88  
The International Court of Justice has held this rule to be a part of customary law. 89   
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Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions obligates States to “respect and to ensure 
respect” for the Conventions “in all circumstances”.  This demonstrates that the 
Conventions are not based on the notion of reciprocity, but are rather, “a series of 
unilateral engagements solemnly contracted before the world as represented by the 
other Contracting Parties.  Each State contracts obligations, 'vis-à-vis' itself and at the 
same time 'vis-à-vis' the others”.90  The use of the phrase “to ensure respect” expresses 
the intention of the drafters to emphasize the responsibility of State parties.  Cassese 
notes that the provision “empowers and even obligates any State party (and under 
customary international law, any State or other international entity) to demand of 
another State party (or any other State entity) that it comply with its obligations under 
the Conventions [...] It follows that the provision also entitles each State party to 
demand the cessation of a serious violation of the Conventions or of the general 
principles of humanitarian law (as well as the case may be, the punishment of the 
culprits)”.91 
 
The ICRC Commentary on Common Article 1 makes reference to Article 29 of Geneva 
Convention IV which establishes that the party to the conflict in whose hands protected 
persons may be is responsible for the treatment accorded to them.  The Commentary 
notes, “It would not, for example, be enough for a State to give orders or directions to a 
few civilian or military authorities, leaving it to them to arrange as they pleased for their 
detailed execution.  It is for the State to supervise the execution of the orders it gives”.92  
 
If a State foresees or is aware that its action or omission is likely to produce prohibited 
consequences, such as the starvation of it citizens, and nevertheless willingly takes the 
risk of committing such an act or omission, then it could be held that the State is 
reckless in its actions by which it fails to meet its obligations.  This type of situation can 
occur for example, where a State, which due to a prolonged armed conflict, is lacking 
the necessary essential resources for its people and fails to raise the alarm within the 
international community to arrange for the provision of humanitarian assistance.  Or in 
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the case of a State which, having employed the ‘scorched earth’ tactic as a method of 
warfare has destroyed objects indispensable to the civilian population, such as 
agricultural areas for the production of food stuffs, crops, livestock or drinking water 
installations.   
 
The ICRC Commentary on Common Article 1 proposes that if a State “is to fulfil the 
solemn undertaking it has given, the State must of necessity prepare in advance, that is 
to say in peacetime, the legal, material or other means of ensuring the faithful 
enforcement of the Convention when the occasion arises”.93  In applying the ICRC 
interpretation in this scenario, a State must prepare means in advance of any armed 
conflict to ensure its civilian population is provided for in the event of emergency.  This 
could include for example, the stockpiling of emergency provisions in times of warfare.  
A State also has the duty to prepare in advance the legal means of ensuring the 
enforcement of the Conventions.  In this way all States are duty bound to have in place 
the necessary legislation to enforce their obligations under the Conventions.  
Unfortunately, not all States are consistent in their legislative approaches.  However, if 
States were to begin to take a universal approach to this obligation it could well result in 
a universal approach to the fundamental humanitarian principles underlying 
international humanitarian law, including the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
those in need.   
 
The ICRC Commentary purports that Common Article 1 does not, however, apply to 
non-international armed conflicts.  These types of armed conflict are covered by 
Common Article 3.94  There is support in this argument in the fact that the requirement 
for States to “respect and to ensure respect” is present in Additional Protocol I,95 but not 
in Additional Protocol II.  However, it could be argued that as Common Article 3 is a 
part of the Geneva Conventions, the requirement to “respect and to ensure respect” for 
the Conventions laid down in Common Article 1 applies to non-international armed 
conflicts too. 
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The issue of a State’s responsibility to carry out its obligations under international 
humanitarian law can become quite problematic when a State is unable to act.  This 
often happens in non-international conflicts.  In some situations the government of a 
State can lose the ability to effectively control its own territory, or a part of its territory 
(e.g., the recent conflict in Sri Lanka between the government and the Tamil Tigers).  In 
other situations, the government of the State can actually break down, resulting in 
different armed groups holding effective control over different parts of the State 
territory, in effect causing the State to become ‘ungovernable’ (e.g., the conflict in 
Somalia in the 1990s).  Where a State has lost control over its territory or part thereof to 
an armed group, the question must be raised, to what extent are armed groups bound by 
international humanitarian law?  Whilst this question is too broad to be dealt with in this 
paper, it is important to note that non-State actors are bound by those provisions which 
have attained the status of customary international humanitarian law and in addition, 
may choose to bind themselves voluntarily to the obligations contained in the 
Conventions and Additional Protocols.96  Non-State actors may also be bound by the 
legislation in force in the State and of course, individuals may be held criminally liable 
under international criminal law for any crimes they commit. 
 
A State may also act recklessly in refusing to accept offers of humanitarian assistance 
when it is in fact needed.  As mentioned in an earlier section of this paper offers of 
relief can come from a number of different sources.97  Article 70(1) of Additional 
Protocol I maintains that offers of relief “shall not be regarded as interference in the 
armed conflict or as unfriendly acts”.  In international armed conflicts, although a State 
may limit the number of societies and organizations allowed to carry out their activities 
in its territory, this limitation shall not hinder the supply of effective and adequate 
relief.98  In non-international armed conflicts relief societies located in the territory of 
the State may explicitly offer their services to the victims of the armed conflict.99  A 
State may be deemed reckless in its action to refuse an offer of humanitarian assistance, 
if it has failed to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the needs of the civilian 
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population under its control.  Under Article 30 of Geneva Convention IV, protected 
persons shall have “every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red 
Lion and Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization 
that might assist them”.  Protected persons within the meaning of Geneva Convention 
IV are those who find themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying 
power of which they are not nationals.100  However, there does not seem to be the same 
right for the civilian population comprising of the nationals of the State in question to 
make such application for assistance.101 
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6 Denial of humanitarian assistance as an international crime 
The denial of humanitarian assistance, as an intentional (or wilful) act or omission to 
deny civilians in need of supplies essential for its survival, can in some circumstances 
constitute an international crime.  Intentional denial may have various aims, for 
example, ethnic cleansing, the siege or blockade of an enemy, the denial of supplies for 
civilians in favour of the fortification of troops, looting or stealing supplies for personal 
gain, denial for reasons of reprisal, or denial due to the uncertain nature of civilian 
population (in cases where there is suspicion that rebel forces are hiding within the 
population).  The type of denial discussed in this section is the intentional act or 
omission of the State itself, the enemy State, the Occupying Power or non-State actors.  
This section will examine under which circumstances the denial of humanitarian 
assistance can be classified as a war crime, as a crime against humanity and as 
genocide.   
 
6.1 War crimes 
War crimes are serious violations of customary international humanitarian law or treaty 
law which make up international humanitarian law.  Grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions are considered war crimes.  In addition, Article 8 of the ICC Statute also 
sets out the prohibited conduct and elements required for an act or omission to 
constitute a war crime.  It is important to note that grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and the two Additional Protocols entail state responsibility, whereas the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) deals with individual criminal responsibility.  The 
Appeal Chamber of the ICTY in the Tadić case contended that even if the Geneva 
Conventions and their Protocols do not explicitly state that a given conduct constitutes a 
crime, violations of both customary and treaty law could still entail individual criminal 
responsibility.102  A war crime may be perpetrated in either an international or non-
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international armed conflict.103  However, a link between the crime and the armed 
conflict must be established for the crime to constitute a war crime.104  
 
6.1.1 Starvation 
Article 54 of Additional Protocol prohibits starvation as a method of warfare in 
international armed conflict.  Starvation as a method of warfare, whilst not specifically 
mentioned as a grave breach of Additional Protocol I, is included as a war crime in 
Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the ICC Statute, including “wilfully impeding relief supplies as 
provided for under the Geneva Conventions”.  These words are of particular 
significance as they specifically categorize a war crime as a deliberate denial of 
humanitarian assistance in breach of the Geneva Conventions. 
 
With respect to starvation in non-international armed conflicts, Article 14 of Additional 
Protocol II states “Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited”.  It is 
not, however, classified as a war crime by the ICC Statute.  However, the ICRC Study 
on customary international humanitarian law confirms that state practice establishes this 
rule as a norm of customary international humanitarian law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.105  
 
6.1.2 Wilful killing or murder 
The war crime of wilful killing or murder can be committed either by act or by 
omission as was confirmed by the ICTY in the Delalić case.106  Murder of civilians is 
prohibited in international conflicts and constitutes a grave breach of international 
humanitarian law.107  The ICRC Commentary on Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV 
which lists the grave breaches of the Convention, states that wilful killing can cover 
cases where death occurs through a fault of omission.  However, the omission must 
have been wilful and there must have been an intention to cause death by it.  The ICRC 
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Commentary states, “It seems, therefore, that persons who gave instructions for the food 
rations of civilian internees to be reduced to such a point that deficiency diseases 
causing death occurred among the detainees would be held responsible”.108  
 
In her article The denial of humanitarian assistance as a crime under international 
law109 Christa Rottensteiner explains that the term “wilful” is understood to include 
“intent” and “recklessness”, but to exclude ordinary negligence, which she finds 
evidence for in the ICRC Commentary on the Geneva Conventions,110 and in various 
decisions of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).  In 
the Delalić case, for example, the ICTY held that “the necessary intent [...] required to 
establish the crimes of wilful killing and murder [...] is present where there is 
demonstrated an intention on the part of the accused to kill, or inflict serious injury in 
reckless disregard of human life”.111  Rottensteiner propounds that if “civilians die as a 
clear result of the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance, for instance if a region is 
completely blocked from the outside world for a long period, then it is arguable that the 
denial constitutes murder if the other conditions are fulfilled.  This could also be the 
case when detainees are unlawfully deprived of the most essential goods”.112  
Therefore, the intentional denial of humanitarian assistance can, under certain 
circumstances, constitute wilful killing.  
 
6.1.3 Torture or inhumane treatment 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits violence to life and persons 
including all kinds of cruel treatment and torture.  Torture and inhumane treatment of 
the civilian population are prohibited by Geneva Convention IV and by both Additional 
Protocols.113  It is also listed as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a war 
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crime under the ICC Statute in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.114  Both can be committed by either an act or omission. 
 
In the Delalić case the ICTY confirmed the definition of torture contained in Article 1 
of the 1984 UN Convention on Torture to be part of customary international law.115  
Article 1 of the Convention requires that the infliction of severe pain or suffering must 
be intentional for such purpose as obtaining information or a confession, punishment, 
intimidation or coercion.  It also requires that the pain and suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other such 
person acting in an official capacity.  Therefore, to constitute the war crime of torture, 
the denial of humanitarian assistance must be proven to cause severe pain and suffering 
which must be intentionally inflicted.  It therefore, might be easier to prove that the 
denial amounts to inhumane treatment.116  
 
Rottensteiner highlights that the ICTY in the Delalić case stated that the condition that 
“the suffering be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence 
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” must be interpreted to 
include officials of non-State parties to a conflict.117  The Tribunal further found that 
torture also extends to officials who “take a passive attitude or turn a blind eye to 
torture”.118  Rottensteiner also notes that the Special Rapporteur on Torture mentioned 
the prolonged denial of food as constituting torture in one of his reports.119 
 
Inhumane treatment is defined in the Elements of Crime for the ICC as the infliction of 
“severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons”.120  The ICTY 
defined it as acts which “violate the principles of humane treatment, particularly the 
respect for human dignity”.121  Rottensteiner notes that depriving civilians or prisoners 
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of war of relief will in many cases be contrary to the principle of humanity and 
therefore constitute inhuman treatment.122  Inhumane treatment is distinguished from 
torture because it does not require that the treatment be inflicted for a specific purpose, 
nor does it require a State official’s involvement.  
 
6.1.4 Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health 
As with wilful killing and torture and inhumane treatment, this class of war crime can 
also be committed by either an intentional act or omission.  Article 32 of Geneva 
Convention IV, prohibits States from taking any measures to cause the physical 
suffering or mutilation of civilians or any other measures of brutality.  Wilfully causing 
great suffering or serious injury to body or health to civilians is listed as a grave breach 
of the Geneva Conventions in international armed conflicts and as war crime under the 
ICC Statute in both international and non-international armed conflicts.123  Violence to 
life and persons is also prohibited in non-international armed conflicts under Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the ICC Statute.  
 
The ICTY in the Furundžija case defined ‘wilfully causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or health’ as an act or omission which causes serious mental or physical 
suffering or injury.  It also confirmed that it covers those acts that do not “meet the 
purposive requirements for the offence of torture”.124  Rottensteiner notes that the 
threshold is also lower for this crime than it is for torture as the definition can also be 
held to cover mental suffering.125 
 
In the Delalić case the ICTY held that the “creation and maintenance of an atmosphere 
of terror in the Celebici prison camp, by itself and a fortiori, together with the 
deprivation of adequate food, water, sleeping and toilet facilities and medical care, 
constitutes the offence of cruel treatment under Article 3 of the Statute, and wilfully 
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causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health under Article 2 of the 
Statute”.126 
 
6.1.5 Outrages upon personal dignity 
Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment is prohibited under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and both 
Additional Protocols.127  It is not listed as a grave breach under the Geneva 
Conventions, however, it is listed as a war crime under the ICC Statute in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.128  
 
‘Outrages upon personal dignity’ is defined in the Elements of Crimes for the ICC as 
acts which humiliate, degrade or otherwise violate the dignity of the person to such a 
degree as to be generally recognized as an outrage upon personal dignity.129  Denial of 
essential supplies to civilians such as food, water and medical supplies could arguably 
amount to such a crime.  
 
6.1.6 Attacks against the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
Article 71(2) of Additional Protocol I obligates States to respect and protect 
humanitarian relief personnel in international armed conflicts.  Whereas Article 18(2) of 
Additional Protocol II does not specifically state that humanitarian personnel be 
protected, it does require that relief be provided.  The safety and security of 
humanitarian relief personnel is crucial to the delivery of humanitarian assistance to 
civilian populations in need.  In addition, the ICRC purports that state practice 
establishes this rule as a norm of customary international humanitarian law applicable 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.130  The ICC Statute 
establishes as a war crime, in both international and non-international armed conflicts, 
“Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
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vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians or civilian objects” under the law of armed conflict.131  Members of 
the armed forces delivering humanitarian aid are, therefore, not covered by this rule. 
 
6.1.7 Collective punishments 
Collective punishment of protected persons is prohibited in international armed 
conflicts under Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV.  They are also prohibited in non-
international armed conflicts under Article 4(2)(b) of Additional Protocol II.  The ICRC 
Commentary on Article 33 of Geneva Convention IV defines collective punishments as 
“penalties of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups of persons in defiance of the 
most elementary principles of humanity, for acts that these persons have not 
committed”.132  The ICRC Commentary on Article 4(2)(b) of Additional Protocol II 
stresses that the term ‘collective punishments’ “should be understood in its widest 
sense”.133  Rottensteiner purports that since these acts are punishable when committed 
in non-international armed conflicts, an argument can be made that they should a 
fortiori be punishable in international armed conflicts. Furthermore, if humanitarian 
assistance is impeded in order to punish certain persons, this could constitute collective 
punishment.134 
 
6.2 Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity are crimes which constitute a serious attack on human dignity 
or a grave humiliation or degradation.  They must be large scale and of extreme gravity 
and must be part of a widespread or systematic attack.  The ICTY in the Blaškić case 
held that ‘systematic’ refers to four elements: i) the existence of a political objective or 
ideology; ii) the commission of a crime on a very large scale against a group of civilians 
or the repeated and continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another; iii) 
the crime involves the preparation and use of significant public or private resources; iv) 
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the implication of high-level authorities in the plan.135  In order to constitute crimes 
against humanity, acts or omissions which are intended to deny civilians in need 
humanitarian assistance must be proven to be widespread or systematic and based on a 
policy or plan.  Seemingly random crimes, such as sporadic attacks on relief convoys or 
the attacking of relief personnel can often be the result of careful planning.  Therefore, 
it can be difficult to prove the widespread or systematic nature of the crimes. 
 
Crimes against humanity are listed under Article 7 of the ICC Statute.  The following 
crimes could result from the denial of humanitarian assistance: murder, extermination, 
torture, persecution and other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  As both 
murder and torture were dealt with above in the section on war crimes they will not be 
dealt with here. 
 
6.2.1 Extermination 
Extermination of civilians is prohibited by Geneva Convention IV.136  The ICTY in the 
Krstić case held that “for the crime of extermination to be established, in addition to the 
general requirements for a crime against humanity, there must be evidence that a 
particular population was targeted and that its members were killed or otherwise 
subjected to conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of a numerically 
significant part of the population”.137  This means that extermination can qualify as a 
crime in situations where some parts of the population are killed and others are not.  
‘Extermination’ is defined by the ICC Statute to include the “intentional infliction of 
conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to 
bring about the destruction of part of a population”.138  Here, a direct link to the denial 
of humanitarian assistance can be interpreted.  If the denial is proven to calculate the 
bringing about of the destruction of part of a population, then it can be deemed to be a 
crime against humanity. 
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6.2.2 Persecution 
Under the ICC Statute, “persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or 
collectivity.139  Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other ground that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act under 
Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
constitutes a crime against humanity.  The ICTY in the Tadić case held the crime of 
persecution to encompass “a variety of acts, including, inter alia, those of a physical, 
economic or judicial nature, that violate an individual’s right to the equal enjoyment of 
his basic rights”.140  “Under customary international law, the bases for persecution are 
alternatives and it is sufficient if one discriminatory basis is present”.141  In light of 
these comments, it could be argued that if humanitarian assistance is denied on a 
discriminatory basis, it could constitute persecution as a crime against humanity. 
 
6.2.3 Other inhumane acts 
Article 7(1)(k) of the ICC Statute classifies as crimes against humanity “other inhumane 
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body 
or to mental or physical health”.  The reference to “acts of a similar character” is to 
those acts listed in Article 7(1)(a) to (j) such as  murder, extermination and torture.  The 
acts must cause injury to human beings in terms of physical or mental integrity, health 
or human dignity.  Cassese notes of this crime, “the rule is important for it may function 
as a ‘residual clause’ covering and criminalizing instances of human behavior that do 
not neatly fall under any of the other existing categories of crimes against humanity”.142  
The denial of humanitarian assistance could arguably constitute an inhumane act if it 
intentionally causes great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health. 
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6.3 Genocide 
Genocide is often referred to as the “Crime of crimes”,143 and is prohibited regardless of 
whether it is perpetrated in time of war or peace.  The definition of genocide laid down 
in Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Genocide Convention) was reproduced in Article 6 of the ICC Statute, 
Article 4 of the ICTY Statute and Article 2 of the ICTR Statute.144  The definition reads, 
“For the purposes of this statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children 
of the group to another group”. 
 
The crime of genocide requires a special intent (dolus specialis) which requires an 
individual to possess the intent to commit the underlying offence (i.e., those offences 
listed in (a) to (e) in the above paragraph), in addition to the intent to destroy in whole 
or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.  In the Akayesu case an 
ICTR Trial Chamber discussed that intent “is a mental factor which is difficult, even 
impossible, to determine” and held that intention could be inferred from a certain 
number of presumptions of fact.  It also added that intent can be inferred from “all acts 
or utterances of the accused, or from the general context in which other culpable acts 
were perpetrated systematically against the same group, regardless of whether such acts 
were committed by the same perpetrator or even by other perpetrators”.145 
 
There have been a number of interpretations as to what “intent to destroy” constitutes 
within the meaning of the definition of genocide.  Legal scholars argue on the one side 
that this intent must be aimed at the physical-biological destruction of the protected 
group and on the other side that the intent also encompasses the destruction of a group 
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as a social unit.  Intent is the most difficult element of genocide to prove, especially as 
in order to convict the accused of any crime under the ICC Statute, the Court must be 
convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.146  Rottensteiner 
recounts in her article, “In the absence of a confession, intent can be inferred only from 
certain factual circumstances. In the case of denial of humanitarian assistance this might 
be particularly difficult: it is already complicated to establish a link between the act of 
impeding and the result, but even more so to prove that the intended result of the denial 
is destruction of a particular group”.147 
 
The phrase "in whole or in part" has also been subject to a number of different 
interpretations.  In the Krstić case the ICTY AC found that "the part must be a 
substantial part of that group.  The aim of the Genocide Convention is to prevent the 
intentional destruction of entire human groups, and the part targeted must be significant 
enough to have an impact on the group as a whole".148  Cassese points out, in what he 
refers to as a “blatant” flaw or omission of the definition of genocide, that the four 
classes of protected groups (national, ethnical, racial and religious) are not defined, nor 
are criteria for their definition provided.149  The Trial Chamber in Akayseu attempted to 
give some definition to these groups.150  
 
The denial of humanitarian assistance may amount to genocide, if the act or omission of 
denial which results in genocide is committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part 
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.  In addition, this intent must be 
accompanied by one of the underlying offences. The offences which are relevant to this 
discussion are those detailed in (a) to (c) below. 
 
(a) Killing members of the group. 
It is clear that the denial of food and medical supplies may result in the killing of 
civilians.  The ICTR in the Akayesu case held that in the context of genocide, “killing” 
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must be interpreted as murder (i.e., intentional or voluntary killing).151  The discussions 
on murder above, in the section on war crimes are also applicable in this category of 
genocide. 
 
(b) Causing serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group. 
The denial of foodstuffs and clothing in the cold winter months may cause serious 
bodily harm to members of a group.  The ICTR in the Akayesu case established that 
causing such harm “does not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and 
irremediable”.152  This stance was reiterated in Krstić, but the ICTY Trial Chamber did 
find in addition that it “must involve a harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, 
embarrassment or humiliation.  It must be a harm that results in a grave and long-term 
disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life”.153  This 
position is altered somewhat in the recent judgement from the ICTR Trial Chamber in 
the Rukundo case.154  In considering mental harm equating to the crime of genocide, the 
Court did not hear evidence of the mental state of the victim, and instead drew 
inferences that the victim suffered mental harm from the evidence presented taking into 
account in particular, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the prohibited 
act.155 
 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part. 
Deliberately starving or allowing members of a group to perish in harsh weather or 
without any medical supplies can bring about conditions of life which will cause its 
physical destruction.  In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber held that this term includes, inter 
alia, “subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from 
homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum 
requirements”.156  In Kayishema and Ruzindana an ICTR Trial Chamber held that this 
offence included the “deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, 
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such as food or medical services”.157  In Braanin, an ICTY Trial Chamber confirmed it 
also included “the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as 
lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion”.158  
 
Cassese highlights an interesting question of whether the killing of only one single 
member of the group, with the required intent, may amount to genocide.159  This could 
be the case where aid is diverted and denied to a group in need, but only one or a few 
civilians die as a result of starvation or lack of medical supplies, services or attention.  
In Akaysesu the Trial Chamber held the view that genocide may be committed even if 
the acts prohibited by Article 2 of ICTR Statute (which deals with genocide) are 
committed against one member of the group.160  Cassese argues that “this broad 
interpretation is not consistent with the text of the norms on genocide, which speak 
instead of ‘members of a group”.161  In his discussion of the customary international 
rule which, he says, does not require that the victims of genocide be numerous, he states 
“the only thing that can be clearly inferred from the rule is that genocide cannot be held 
to occur when there is only one victim.  However, as long as the other requisite 
elements are present, the killing or commission of the other enumerated offences 
against more than one person may amount to genocide”.162  
 
A person who directly and publicly incites others to prevent humanitarian assistance 
from reaching those in need by, for example, diverting convoys, disrupting their routes 
or attacking them, with the requisite intent, may be held responsible for incitement to 
commit genocide.163  In accordance with Article 27 of the ICC Statute, the Statute 
applies equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.  In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government shall in no case exempt a 
person from criminal responsibility.  Therefore, should a Government official or even 
the Head of State order (directly and publicly) the denial of humanitarian assistance to a 
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protected group, with the intent to destroy it in whole or in part, he/she will be liable for 
prosecution for the crime of genocide.   
 
Article 28(1) of the ICC Statute provides for the possibility of a military commander, or 
person effectively acting as a military commander to be held criminally responsible for 
crimes committed by forces under his or her effective command and control (or 
effective authority and control as the case may be).  Article 28(2) of the ICC Statute 
contains similar provisions for superior and subordinate relationships not of a military 
character (i.e., a civilian superior).  Distinction is made in Article 28 between civilian 
and military superiors, requiring a more stringent mens rea164 standard for the former 
than the latter.  Cassese notes that it has been purported that the ICC Statute appears to 
allow genocide to be committed on a lower mens rea element in the case of superior 
command, as commanders can seemingly incur liability for genocide committed by 
their subordinates even if they have no real knowledge of the crime.  However, he states 
this contention may be objected to only be true in cases where the superior knows that a 
genocide is about to be perpetrated (or is being committed) and deliberately fails to 
prevent or repress it.165  
 
Whilst the above discussion on genocide has largely focused on individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of genocide, it is important to note that under both the 
Genocide Convention and the ICC Statute, State parties are obligated to criminalize and 
punish authors of genocide.  The International Court of Justice in the Bosnia v Serbia 
case held that the Genocide Convention upholds a duality of responsibility for genocide, 
which entails national and international responsibility on the part of individuals and 
States.166  The Court concluded that Article I of the Genocide Convention, in addition to 
imposing a duty on States to prevent and punish genocide, also prohibited them from 
committing it themselves.167  The Court further concluded that the obligation to prevent 
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genocide is not limited to the State's own territory.168  The obligation on States requires 
them to exercise due diligence in employing “all means reasonably available to them, so 
as to prevent genocide so far as possible".169  However, critics170 of this judgment argue 
that the Convention’s provisions only cover individual criminal responsibility and that 
state responsibility is in fact covered by customary international law.  Cassese purports 
that genocidal acts are normally “in fact part of a pattern of conduct tolerated, approved, 
or condoned by governmental authorities”.171  
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The intention of this paper has been to offer a substantive assessment of the duties 
incumbent on States under international humanitarian law to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the civilian population under its control.  In doing so, it has sought to 
provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the relevant provisions and 
customary law rules in international humanitarian law.  It has explored what constitutes 
humanitarian assistance and who is entitled to receive it.  It has also proffered an insight 
into the definition of a “civilian” and the protection afforded to civilians in time of 
armed conflict.  The paper has covered four main areas where humanitarian assistance 
may be denied by the State to the civilian population under its control and has analyzed 
the legality of such denial.  It has also examined in depth where such denial may 
constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and an international crime.  Also 
discussed in the paper are those provisions in international humanitarian law which may 
need more clarification and the areas in which gaps may exist in the law. 
 
7.1 Filling the gaps 
There seems to be a gap in the protection afforded to civilians that are nationals of a 
State party to a conflict.  Whilst the provisions of Part II of Geneva Convention IV 
(which includes Article 23) cover the whole of the populations of the countries in 
conflict, the requirements under Article 23 only obligate States to allow free passage of 
relief consignments (which is of course subject to permissible exceptions) if intended 
for those civilians of another State Party to the Conventions, even if an adversary; and 
“likewise” free passage of consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics 
intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.  It is 
unfortunate that Geneva Convention IV does not obligate States to allow for the passage 
of relief consignments for the civilian population as a whole.  It also does not obligate a 
State to allow free passage of relief consignments to its own civilians (i.e., the nationals 
of the State party in question).  
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There also seems to be a gap in protection with respect to the right of the civilian 
population to request assistance.  Under Article 30 of Geneva Convention IV, the right 
is granted to make application for assistance, however, this right is only afforded to 
“protected persons”, which by virtue of Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV, do not 
include a States own nationals, only those who find themselves in the hands of a party 
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.  Nor does Article 4 
include nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a party to the 
conflict.  Even the requirement of humane treatment in Article 27 of Geneva 
Convention IV is directed at protected persons.  It seems, therefore, that under Geneva 
Convention IV (which has more State Parties to it than the Additional Protocols), a 
civilian population which is denied humanitarian assistance by its own State has little 
right under international humanitarian law to request or receive assistance.  The ICRC 
Commentary on Article 4 is evidence of this conclusion, stating, “The Convention thus 
remains faithful to a recognized principle of international law: it does not interfere in a 
State's relations with its own nationals.”172      
 
The situation is altered somewhat when considering Additional Protocol I, which does 
provide protection for the nationals of a State party to the conflict.  Article 50 of 
Additional Protocol I provides a broad scope for defining a “civilian”; even in the case 
of doubt a person shall be considered a civilian.  Whilst Article 23 of Geneva 
Convention IV stipulates that consignments should be allowed free passage when 
“intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party”, Article 70 of 
Additional Protocol I on the other hand makes no such distinction, stipulating that free 
passage be granted “even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the 
adverse party”.  The drafting of Article 70(2), therefore, allows for a much broader 
interpretation of this requirement of free passage, and it could be argued that under 
Article 70(2) States must allow free passage of consignments to any intended civilian 
population, even to their own nationals. 
 
The fundamental guarantee of humane treatment afforded by Common Article 3 to 
“persons taking no active part in the hostilities” goes some way to address the gap in 
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protection left by Geneva Convention IV.  Although referring to non-international 
armed conflicts in the Convention itself, the customary status of common Article 3 
means it is applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.  The 
denial of humanitarian assistance to those in need would undoubtedly constitute 
inhumane treatment.  In addition, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I guarantees 
humane treatment to those in the power of a party to the conflict who do not benefit 
from a more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under Additional Protocol 
I.  
 
Another gap in protection exists when the civilian population are reliant on the will of 
the State in order to receive relief.  In international armed conflicts relief actions shall 
be undertaken subject to the agreement of the parties concerned in such relief actions.173  
In non-international armed conflicts, relief actions shall be undertaken subject to the 
consent of the State concerned.174  The civilian population is therefore dependent on the 
State consenting to such relief actions, which may be problematic particularly where a 
State is for example, conducting a genocidal campaign against its population, or in 
situations where the civilians in need are those in the territory under the effective 
control of a non-State actor.  The above problem is negated only by the guarantee of 
humane treatment provided to the civilian population by Article 4 of Additional 
Protocol II, and of course in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  
 
Therefore, the guarantee of humane treatment seems to afford the most protection to 
those civilians not in the power of an enemy or of an Occupying Power.  Civilians in 
non-international armed conflicts have fewer privileges and protections than those in 
international armed conflicts.  A State’s own nationals have no right to request 
assistance from outside their own State under international humanitarian law; this is 
also true of the civilian population in non-international armed conflicts.  Where a 
civilian population is in need of essential supplies for its survival, it is important that the 
facility exist for them to raise the alarm within the international community.  This is 
especially important in countries where the media is highly restricted or not allowed 
free movement, or where the State has collapsed or intends to deny humanitarian 
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assistance in circumstances which amount to a criminal offence under international law.  
This is an area that needs to be addressed in the future development of the law, so that 
individuals do not need to rely on the will of their own State in order to receive 
humanitarian assistance. 
 
7.2 The way forward 
Although the jurisprudence arising from the ICC and other ad hoc tribunals such as the 
ICTY and ICTR go some way to provide enforcement mechanisms for international 
humanitarian law by punishing violators of the law, what is needed is effective 
mechanisms to enforce implementation of the law before such violations occur.  Whilst 
one might purport that these courts act as a deterrent for future violators it has not yet 
been assessed to what extent this holds true.  The ICC has not been in existence for long 
enough to assess the deterrent effect it has on States or individual perpetrators and has 
yet to convict anyone.  Before a perpetrator can be brought to justice there must exist, 
not only the political will to act either amongst the international community or by the 
State itself, but also the resources to take action in the first place.  State practice has 
shown a reluctance from States to get involved in matters of no direct concern to them, 
but it may be considered unlawful for a State to maintain a passive attitude when it is in 
a position to take action.  Failure to respond allows the rights of those protected under 
international humanitarian law to be abused.175  
 
Not only is there is a need for effective implementation measures but also timely ones.  
The UNSC has periodically confirmed its commitment to the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, however, it often does not respond to violations in a timely nor effective 
way.  Resolutions are passed which “urge” or “demand” compliance with obligations to 
provide humanitarian assistance,176 but where violations are not considered a threat to 
international peace and security, it can be a lengthy process to ensure essential supplies 
reach those in need.  Violations by non-state actors are also extremely difficult to assess 
or remedy.  In times of armed conflict it is also difficult to obtain the necessary 
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information to assess the needs of civilian population, particularly those in territory 
under the effective control of a non-State actor.   
 
A stronger adherence by the international community to Common Article 1 to “respect 
and to ensure respect” for the Conventions in all circumstances is greatly needed to 
ensure that where serious breaches of international humanitarian law take place, such as 
the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance to those in need, these violations are 
addressed and remedied as quickly as possible.  Where such denial is criminal, it is 
important that the perpetrators are brought to justice.   
 
If something is done to enforce and promote compliance amongst States under 
Common Article 1 perhaps this could reduce the number of cases in which 
humanitarian assistance is denied.  This is in keeping with the values of "the principles 
of humanity" and "the dictates of the public conscience" contained within the Marten’s 
Clause which must be borne in mind when considering the provision of humanitarian 
assistance to those in need.  Interpretations of the law should afford the greatest level of 
protection possible. As the four Geneva Conventions celebrate their 60th year since 
adoption, it may be appropriate to reflect on the statements made by Jakob 
Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, at the ceremony to celebrate the 60th anniversary 
of the Geneva Conventions. “Humanitarian issues arise […] in part because of a lack of 
rules, or because the rules are too broad or vague, leaving much to subjective 
interpretation. These areas include access to populations in need of humanitarian 
assistance […] The essential spirit of the Geneva Conventions – to uphold human life 
and dignity even in the midst of armed conflict – is as important now as it was 60 years 
ago”.177  
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